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We are at a moment in which the rage of uncertainties is unusually wide. We have just passed through the worst financial crisis since World War Two. It is quantitatively much larger and qualitatively different from other financial crisis. The only relevant comparisons are with the Japanese real estate bubble which burst in 1991 and from which Japan has still not recovered, and with the Great Depression of the 1930s. What differentiates this crisis from the Japanese experience is that the latter was confined to a single country, while this crisis has involved the entire world. What differentiates it from the Great Depression is that this time the financial system was not allowed to collapse but was put on artificial life support.
在我们这个时期，各种不确定因素无处不在。我们刚刚度过了二战以来最严重的金融危机。危机不仅规模更大，而就其性质而言，也与其他金融危机有所不同。可与之相提并论的只有日本至今依然饱受其害的1991年房地产泡沬破灭，以及20纪30年代的美国经济大萧条。与日本的危机相比， 这次金融危机席卷了整个世界，而前者仅限于一个国家；与大萧条相比，这次危机金融系统没有崩溃，而是依赖生命保障系统来维持。
In fact, the magnitude of the credit and leverage problem we have today is even greater than in the 1930s. In 1929, total credit outstanding in die United States was 160% of GDP and it rose to 250% by 1932; in 2008 we started at 365% — and this calculation does not take into account the pervasive use of derivatives which was absent in the 1930s.
实际上，我们今天所面临的信贷和杠杆问题比20世纪30年代严重的多。在1929年，美国信贷总额占国内生产总值的160%，1932 年上升至 250%；2008年则高达365%，且这一数据不包括20世纪30年代没有而现在广泛使用的金融衍生品。
