评论
打印
By 2006, 40 percent of all the loans made that year, all the home loans made that year,were liar's loans,40 percent.
截至2006年，当年发放的所有贷款，当年的所有房屋贷款中四成是欺骗性贷款。高达四成啊，亲。
And this is despite a warning from the industry's own antifraud experts that said that these loans were an open invitation to fraudsters, and that they had a fraud incidence of 90 percent,nine zero.
行业自身的反欺诈专家曾经警告，这些贷款简直是引狼入室，诈骗率高达九成，百分之九十。尽管有这些警告，问题还是发生了。
In response to that, the industry first started calling these loans liar's loans, which lacks a certain subtlety, and second, massively increased them, and no government regulator ever required or encouraged any lender to make a liar's loan or anyone to purchase a liar's loan,and that explicitly includes Fannie and Freddie.
作为回应，金融行业首先开始称呼这些贷款为欺骗性借贷，听上去不太悦耳。其次，大幅增加这种贷款。没有任何政府监管机构要求或者鼓励任何借方放出欺骗性贷款要求或鼓励任何人去购买欺骗性借贷，这当然也包括房利美和房地美。
This came from the lenders because of the fraud recipe.
由于欺诈的成因和模式，借方难辞其咎。
What happened to appraisal fraud?
估价欺诈行为又是怎样呢？
It expanded remarkably as well.
同样膨胀得非常了得。
By 2007, when a survey of appraisers was done,90 percent of appraisers reported that they had been subject to coercion from the lenders trying to get them to inflate an appraisal.
2007年，有份针对估价师的调查，9成受访的估价师表示，他们受到借方的胁迫，要求他们对估值进行灌水（夸大价值）。
In other words, both forms of fraud became absolutely endemic and normal,and this is what drove the bubble.
换言之，两种形式的欺诈行为成为常态，疯狂肆虐，泡沫于是成型。
What happened in the governmental sector?
政府部门的情况呢？
Well, the government, as I told you,when we were the savings and loan regulators,we could only deal with our industry,and if people gave up their federal deposit insurance,we couldn't do anything to them.
政府啊，不提也罢，说多了都是泪，我们监管储贷的时候，我们只能处理我们负责的行业，如果借方放弃他们的联邦存款保险，我们就将束手无策。
Congress, it may strike you as impossible, but actually did something intelligent in 1994,and passed the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act that gave the Fed, and only the Federal Reserve,the explicit, statutory authority to ban liar's loans by every lender,whether or not they had federal deposit insurance.
国会，说起来你们可能不信，在1994年实际上倒是干了点实事，通过了《房屋所有权和股权保护法》，法案赋权美联储，仅限美联储明确的法律权力去取缔来自任何借方的欺骗性贷款业务，无论这些借方有无联邦存款保险。
So what did Ben Bernanke and Alan Greenspan,as chairs of the Fed, do when they got these warnings that these were massively fraudulent loans and that they were being sold to the secondary market?
在接到这些预警信号：这些大面积的欺诈性贷款这些要转售给次级市场的欺骗性贷款作为美联储主席到底做了些什么？
Remember, there's no fraud exorcist.
请记住，没有神人能将这些欺诈行为消失。
Once it starts out a fraudulent loan, it can only be sold to the secondary market through more frauds, lying about the reps and warrantees,and then those people are going to produce mortgage-backed securities and exotic derivatives which are also going to be supposedly backed by those fraudulent loans.
欺骗性贷款一旦出现，只能通过更多的欺诈行为，如编造合约声明和保证条款把这一借款转售给次级市场。然后借方再推出抵押贷款证券和衍生产品，而为这些产品进行担保的正是欺骗性借款。
So the fraud is going to progress through the entire system,hyperinflate the bubble, produce a disaster.
欺诈行为将贯穿整个系统的始终，使泡沫急剧膨胀，进而造成灾难。
And remember, we had experience with this.
想想看，这事我们之前经历过。
We had seen significant losses,and we had experience of competent regulators in stopping it.
我们遭受了巨大的损失，职能监管机构也有阻止危机出现的先例。
Greenspan and Bernanke refused to use the authority under the statute to stop liar's loans.
但是格林斯潘和伯南克拒绝使用法律赋予他们的权力来取缔欺骗性借贷。
