The authors argue that the fees prevent genuine claimants from enforcing their employment rights.
In many cases the expected payoff is lower than the fee for starting the tribunal—which is not necessarily refunded even if the claim is upheld.
The authors calculate that abandoning even a claim guaranteed to succeed is the rational response for 35-50% of would-be claimants.
Worse, there is little evidence that the fees have deterred only frivolous or mendacious claims.
If that were the case one would expect the success rate of claimants to have risen.
Instead, since 2012-13 the proportion of complaints that are struck out or dismissed has roughly doubled.
It may be that people with small but legitimate grievances have been deterred, whereas those who feel confident enough to game the system have gone ahead.
Even if convinced by such arguments, the Supreme Court may not recommend the abolition of fees entirely.
A report last year from the Justice Committee of the House of Commons acknowledged that a contribution by users to the costs of operating courts was not objectionable in principle.
A recent government review made a similar argument.
Yet Ms Adams and Mr Prassl argue that the steepness of the fees makes them a “disproportionate restriction on litigants' right of access to the employment tribunals”.
但是Ms Adams 和Mr Prassl argue认为，费用的陡度使他们成了“对诉讼当事人通往就业法庭不成比例的限制”。
That is bad not just for litigants but for Britain's labour market generally.