评论
打印
Let's say you despise Western democracy.
假设你很反感西方民主。
Democracy, in all its trappings, free elections, town halls, endless debates about the proper role of government.
一切民主制度的衍生物，像自由选举、市政厅，以及关于政府角色的无数论辩。
Too messy, too unpredictable, too constraining for your taste.
这些都太乱，不可捉摸，在你看来局限太多。
And the way these democracies band together and lecture everyone else about individual rights and freedoms -- it gets under your skin.
而种种制度都在一起向人们灌输个人权利和自由的观念--这让你恼火。
So what to do about it? You can call out the hypocrisy and failures of Western democracies and explain how your way is better,
那怎么办？你可以揭露西方民主的虚伪和失败，说你的主张的优势，
but that's never really worked for you.
但这对你而言并不实际。
What if you could get the people whose support is the very foundation of these democracies to start questioning the system?
那如果你能让民主制度的中坚分子开始质疑这套制度呢？
Make the idea occur in their own minds that democracy and its institutions are failing them,
让这些人自己感到民主及其机制辜负了他们，
their elite are corrupt puppet masters and the country they knew is in free fall.
精英阶层腐败透顶，上下其手，这个国家正急速衰落。
To do that, you'll need to infiltrate the information spheres of these democracies.
要做到这些，就要潜入相关机构的信息系统。
You'll need to turn their most powerful asset -- an open mind -- into their greatest vulnerability.
你要把民主最强有力的武器--开明思想--变成其要害。
You'll need people to question the truth.
要让人们开始质疑所谓真相。
Now, you'll be familiar of hacking and leaks that happened in 2016.
我想大家都熟知2016年的黑客入侵和泄密事件。
One was the Democratic National Committee's networks, and the personal email accounts of its staff, later released on WikiLeaks.
一个是民主党全国委员会（DNC）网站资料及其成员的电邮被窃取，并发布在维基解密上。
After that, various online personas, like a supposed Romanian cybercriminal who didn't speak Romanian,
之后，网上有好几个人，比如一个据说是罗马尼亚人，却不会说该国语言的网络罪犯，
aggressively pushed news of these leaks to journalists.
极力向媒体推送有关消息。
The media took the bait. They were consumed by how much the DNC hated Bernie.
媒体上钩了。记者们只关注DNC多么讨厌伯尼·桑德。
At the time, it was that narrative that far outshined the news that a group of Russian government sponsored hackers
那段时间，DNC和伯尼间的恩怨远比某个俄国政府支持的黑客组织更吸引人
who we called "Advanced Persistent Threat 28," or "APT28" for short, was carrying out these operations against the US.
该组织被称为高持续性威胁28，简称APT28，正是它进行了此次入侵。
And there was no shortage of evidence. This group of Russian government hackers hadn't just appeared out of nowhere in 2016.
此事证据确凿。这一黑客组织并不是到了2016年才凭空出现的。
We had started tracking this group back in 2014.
从2014年起我们就在追踪它。
And the tools that APT28 used to compromise its victims' networks demonstrated a thoughtful,
APT28所使用的入侵手段表明其行动有计划性，
well-resourced effort that had taken place for now over a decade in Moscow's time zone from about 9 am to 6 pm.
资源充足，且运作长达十数年，在莫斯科时区范围内十分活跃。
APT28 loved to prey on the emails and contacts of journalists in Chechnya, the Georgian government, eastern European defense attachés
APT28常常盯上记者的电邮和通信记录，目标包括车臣、格鲁吉亚政府和东欧各国驻外武官，
all targets with an undeniable interest to the Russian government.
都是俄罗斯政府的兴趣所在。
We weren't the only ones onto this. Governments, research teams across the world,
并非只有我们关注他们。各国政府和全世界的研究团队
were coming to similar conclusions and observing the same types of operations.
都得出了相似的结论，都注意到类似的活动。
But what Russia was doing in 2016 went far beyond espionage.
但2016年俄罗斯的所作所为远不止窃取情报。
The DNC hack was just one of many where stolen data was posted online accompanied by a sensational narrative,
和DNC事件一样，被窃信息经常在网上发布，辅以敏感的描写，
then amplified in social media for lightning-speed adoption by the media.
在社交媒体上被放大，好在短时间内得到媒体大量报道。
This didn't ring the alarm bells that a nation-state was trying to interfere with the credibility of another's internal affairs.
人们不会警觉一个国家正试图破坏他国处理内政上的公信力。
So why, collectively, did we not see this coming?
那么从集体角度看，为什么我们没预见到？
Why did it take months before Americans understood that they were under a state-sponsored information attack?
为什么几个月后美国民众才意识到这是外国暗中支持的黑客行为？
The easy answer is politics. The Obama Administration was caught in a perfect catch-22.
简单而言，政治。奥巴马政府正处于自相矛盾的困境中。
By raising the specter that the Russian government was interfering in the US presidential campaign,
要是指出俄罗斯有可能干预美国总统大选，
the Administration risked appearing to meddle in the campaign itself. But the better answer, I think,
政府自己很可能背上干预大选的骂名。但我想，更确切的是，
is that the US and the West were utterly unequipped to recognize and respond to a modern information operation,
美国和其他西方国家根本没准备好辨别和应对现代信息战，
despite the fact that the US had wielded information with devastating success in an era not so long ago.
哪怕美国在信息技术方面长期以来有着压倒性优势。
Look, so while the US and the West spent the last 20 years caught up in cybersecurity
因此在过去20年里，美国和其他西方国家忙着加强网络安全，
what networks to harden, which infrastructure to deem critical, how to set up armies of cyber warriors and cyber commands
哪些网络需要加强防护，哪些设备必须重视，如何组建网络军队和指挥系统，
Russia was thinking in far more consequential terms.
俄罗斯却在考虑影响更为深远的策略。
Before the first iPhone even hit the shelf, the Russian government understood the risks and the opportunity
早在苹果手机上市之前，俄罗斯就了解了
that technology provided and the inter-communication and instant communication it provided us.
技术和交际与即时通讯方式带来的风险、机会。
As our realities are increasingly based on the information that we're consuming at the palm of our hand
我们的生活越来越依赖于通过移动设备阅读媒体推送，
and from the news feeds that we're scanning and the hashtags and stories that we see trending,
关注热门话题，以获取信息，
the Russian government was the first to recognize how this evolution had turned your mind into the most exploitable device on the planet.
俄罗斯第一个意识到这种革命性现象能将人心变为最容易利用的武器。
And your mind is particularly exploitable if you're accustomed to an unfettered flow of information, now increasingly curated to your own tastes.
特别是有些人喜欢关注来自非法渠道的信息，这类信息常常根据他们的兴趣加工过。
This panorama of information that's so interesting to you gives a state, or anyone for that matter, a perfect back door into your mind.
这样呈现的信息很能引人关注，给了国家或其他人一个后门进入你的思想。
It's this new brand of state-sponsored information operations that can be that much more successful, more insidious,
正是这种由国家运作的新型信息战，更能取得成功，更隐秘，
and harder for the target audience -- that includes the media -- to decipher and characterize.
对其目标人群而言，包括媒体，更难辨识和判别。
If you can get a hashtag trending on Twitter, or chum the waters with fake news directed to audiences primed to receive it,
如果能制造推特热点话题，或是散布虚假新闻作为诱饵，故意让某些人群看到，
or drive journalists to dissect terabytes of email for a cent of impropriety -- all tactics used in Russian operations
让记者们检查大量电邮以寻找敏感的字句--这些在俄罗斯的行动中均可看到，
then you've got a shot at effectively camouflaging your operations in the mind of your target.
那么就能在不知不觉间有效地左右目标人群的想法。
This is what Russia's long called "reflexive control."
这就是俄罗斯一直说的“反身性控制”，
It's the ability to use information on someone else so that they make a decision on their own accord that's favorable to you.
即你可以通过对目标人群释放信息，诱导他们做出判断，他们自主的判断，却对你有利。
This is nation-state-grade image control and perception management,
这是在国家层面上操控公共形象和认知，
and it's conducted by any means, with any tools, network-based or otherwise, that will achieve it.
有很多种途径来实现，很多工具可以利用，无论是不是基于网络。
Take this for another example. In early February 2014, a few weeks before Russia would invade Crimea, a phone call is posted on YouTube.
有另一个例子。2014年2月，俄罗斯入侵克里米亚几周前，一段电话录音被传到YouTube上。
In it, there's two US diplomats. They sound like they're playing kingmaker in Ukraine, and worse,
录音中是两名美国外交官，似乎在谈论在乌克兰扶植政权，
they curse the EU for its lack of speed and leadership in resolving the crisis.
还骂欧盟行动迟缓，缺乏领导力，不能解决危机。
The media covers the phone call, and then the ensuing diplomatic backlash leaves Washington and Europe reeling.
媒体报道了这一事件，随之而来的外交僵局让美国和欧洲措手不及。
And it creates a fissured response and a feckless attitude towards Russia's land grab in Ukraine. Mission accomplished.
于是美欧都不能有力地回击，听任俄罗斯占领克里米亚。目标达成。
So while hacked phone calls and emails and networks keep grabbing the headlines,
所以，泄露的电话录音、邮件和网站资料屡屡占据头条，
the real operations are the ones that are influencing the decisions you make and the opinions you hold,
与此同时，真正的目标却是影响你的判断，左右你的观点，
all in the service of a nation-state's strategic interest. This is power in the information age.
好为某个国家的战略利益服务。这就是信息时代的力量。
And this information is all that much more seductive, all that much easier to take at face value and pass on, when it's authentic.
这些信息变得更加诱人，更容易让人从表面解读，更易于传播，因其像模像样。
Who's not interested in the truth that's presented in phone calls and emails that were never intended for public consumption?
只有电话录音和邮件里才有不会公开的东西，谁会不感兴趣？
But how meaningful is that truth if you don't know why it's being revealed to you?
但这些若是出于某种原因给你看的，又有何意义？
We must recognize that this place where we're increasingly living,
我们必须意识到，网络越来越多地介入生活，
which we've quaintly termed "cyberspace," isn't defined by ones and zeroes, but by information and the people behind it.
这个我们称之为“网络空间”的地方，起决定作用的并非0和1，而是信息和信息背后的人。
This is far more than a network of computers and devices.
它并不只是电脑和其他设备组成。
This is a network composed of minds interacting with computers and devices.
它是由与电脑等设备交互的无数人组成的网络。
And for this network, there's no encryption, there's no firewall, no two-factor authentication, no password complex enough to protect you.
对于这样的网络，没有加密，没有防火墙，没有双重认证，没有复杂的密码保护你。
What you have for defense is far stronger, it's more adaptable, it's always running the latest version.
能保护你的，更为强大，更易于更新，永远都是最新版本。
It's the ability to think critically: call out falsehood, press for the facts.
那就是批判性思维：揭穿谎言，逼近事实。
And above all, you must have the courage to unflinchingly pursue the truth.
但首先，你必须要有勇气不懈地追寻真相。
