Step back a bit, however, and the TFA looks rather bedraggled.
It rose out of the ashes of the Doha round, the last big attempt at a global trade deal, as the least controversial item.
Grand trade deals, never very high on governments' agendas, have in recent decades aimed more at locking in existing practice than at winning important new concessions.
The TFA reflects curtailed ambition, after plans for agreements in areas such as intellectual property and trade in services were abandoned.
Its cuddly inclusivity comes at a cost.
Poorer countries have flexibility over which standards they will put in place immediately, which they need time for—and which they need money for.
Some bits of the agreement are exhortations rather than rules. Implementation may be slow.
A study published in December 2016 noted that even when regional trade agreements include trade-facilitation provisions, they are not always put into effect.
A committee will oversee implementation, but insiders doubt how much pressure non-compliant governments will really face.
Eight months after Mr Azevedo triumphantly hailed the WTO's success in brokering its first deal, India very nearly scuppered it, holding it hostage over an unrelated argument about agricultural subsidies. (WTO wonks still smart at the memory.)
Eventually, America thrashed out a compromise in a side-agreement.
So the TFA's history highlights the belligerence of some governments; and, alarmingly for those following the pronouncements on trade of the new Trump administration, the importance of American leadership.