Recent research is less definitive.
Franois Geerolf of the University of California, Los Angeles believes that Japan suffers from dynamic inefficiency.
And he cannot rule out the possibility that all the G7 countries (and nine others) suffer similarly.
If so, the implications are provocative.
They imply that G7 public debt is soaking up money that would otherwise be spent on further augmenting an overbuilt capital stock.
Insofar as the proceeds of this government borrowing are spent on health care and pensions, the elderly benefit disproportionately.
Perhaps, then, G7 public debt is diverting unfruitful efforts to provide for the future into providing for the elderly instead.
Several scholars, including Qian Liangxin of Anhui University, also point out that China often ploughs more into its capital stock than it earns from it.
At China's stage of development, this may not be a bad thing, because the economy's capital-intensity is still in flux.
But the combination of fast growth and repressed returns on saving may help explain why China is so prone to speculative bubbles, especially in property.
Working-age Chinese overpay for houses, many of which stand empty, on the assumption that they will sell them at higher prices—not to a greater fool necessarily, but to a younger, richer one.
William Miller's proto-Ponzi scheme lasted less than a year.
His banks (including the Hide and Leather National Bank Of New York) closed his accounts and newspapers hounded him.
他的银行（包括Hide and Leather National Bank Of New York）关闭了他的账户，报纸对他紧追不放。
He fled to Canada (eluding one pursuer by ducking into a Chinese laundry, according to Mark Gribben of the Malefactor's Register, a blog) before the police eventually caught up with him.
But he never actually ran out of investors.
Even as he was escaping the country, envelopes addressed to his syndicate piled up at the post office, filled with contributions from the next generation of believers.