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America’s opposition to China’s creation of an Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank is degenerating into a self-defeating farce. Having failed to prevent western allies from joining the fledgling bank, Washington has been left scowling on the sidelines. The Obama administration’s handling of the issue has been embarrassing — and it may hold ominous portents for Asia and the rest of the world.
美国反对中国创建亚洲基础设施投资银行（Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank，简称亚投行）的做法，正在弄巧成拙，沦为一出自己打败自己的闹剧。在未能阻止西方盟国加入这家新银行之后，华盛顿被晾在一边独自郁闷。奥巴马政府对这个问题的处理令人尴尬——这对亚洲乃至世界其他地区可能是不祥的征兆。
This week, 57 prospective members assembled in Singapore to devise the rules of the new Beijing-sponsored development institution. Among those attending are US allies such as the UK, France, Germany and South Korea. Aside from Washington, only Canada and Japan have stayed away.
本周，57个准成员国在新加坡开会，拟定这家北京发起的新的发展机构的规则。与会的美国盟友包括英国、法国、德国和韩国。除了美国以外，只有加拿大和日本置身事外。
Since 1945, the US has played a hegemonic role in the world’s financial system, propped by the might of the dollar and the lapidary heft of the Bretton Woods institutions: the World Bank and IMF. Top dogs rarely welcome a pushy rival. Surrendering the role of primus inter pares is hard.
自1945年以来，美国以美元的威力和布雷顿森林机构——世界银行(World Bank)和国际货币基金组织(IMF)——的重量级地位为依托，一直在世界金融体系中扮演霸权角色。做老大的很少欢迎爱出风头的对手。放弃掌门人角色是很难的。
But Washington’s principled reasons for opposing the bank do not stack up. True, China’s bilateral lending practices have hardly underpinned its claim to good governance. But it is premature to dismiss the AIIB as Beijing mercantilism writ large.
但华盛顿反对亚投行的原则性理由是站不住脚的。没错，中国的双边放贷实践难以支撑其良好治理的说法。但就此将亚投行视为北京重商主义的体现就过早了。
China is keen to show that it can host a respectable multilateral institution. It has been careful not to politicise the bank. It has put Jin Liqun, an international bureaucrat with experience of the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB), at its head. His brief has been to apply globally accepted principles of governance.
中国渴望证明，它能够主持一家受尊敬的多边机构。迄今中国小心翼翼地不让亚投行政治化。它已任命在世行和亚洲开发银行（Asian Development Bank，简称亚行）有工作经验的国际官员金立群执掌该行。他过去的使命就是实行全球公认的治理原则。
Convincing doubters that the AIIB is not a vehicle for brute Chinese power was never going to be quick or easy. But Mr Jin’s early steps give some confidence. He has for instance recruited widely: roughly half the nascent institution’s employees so far are non-Chinese. And while AIIB has yet to settle upon a final governance structure, Beijing seems willing to give oversight to its other members.
要说服怀疑者相信亚投行不是中国硬实力的工具，从来就不容易。但金立群的早期举措让人产生一定的信心。比如，他进行了广泛招募：这家新机构迄今大约一半的雇员是非中国籍人士。而且，尽管亚投行还没有决定最终的治理结构，但北京似乎愿意让其它成员国拥有监督权。
China is understood to favour a 75 per cent-25 per cent voting split between Asian and non-Asian members (with allocations made according to gross domestic product). On the basis of the current membership roll, that would give Beijing about 43 per cent of the votes, according to analysis by Benn Steil and Dinah Walker at the Council for Foreign Relations.
据信中国支持在亚洲和非亚洲成员国之间按照75%/25%的比例安排表决权（然后按照GDP规模进行分配）。根据美国外交关系协会(Council on Foreign Relations)的本•斯泰尔(Benn Steil)和黛娜•沃克(Dinah Walker)所作的分析，按照目前的成员国名册，这将给予北京大约43%的投票权重。
There are reports that China has forsworn its veto power. If this is the case, then it would be more democratic than the approach taken by the US, which retains a final say at both the IMF and World Bank despite having less than 20 per cent of the votes.
有报道称，中国承诺放弃否决权。若果真如此，那将比美国采取的方式更为民主；美国在IMF和世行都保留了最后决定权，尽管投票权重不到20%。
The Obama administration’s reflexive hostility to the establishment of the AIIB risks giving the impression that the US is less interested in Asian development than in restraining Beijing. The US would be unwise to give China further excuses to claim that it is bent on containment.
对于亚投行的成立，奥巴马政府表现出反射性的敌意，其风险在于给人这样一种印象，即美国更感兴趣的是遏制中国，而不是亚洲的发展。如果美国让中国有更多借口宣传美国一门心思要遏制中国，那将是不明智的。
Washington’s stance has relevance to its Asian allies, particularly Japan. Tokyo is understood to be considering joining the AIIB, even though it is already the leading power in the ADB. Rather than leaning on Japan to stay out, the US should realise that the presence of its allies in the AIIB would give its allies a much bigger say in the bank and dilute Chinese voting power.
华盛顿的立场对其亚洲盟国（尤其是日本）来说很重要。东京方面据信正在考虑加入亚投行，即使日本已经是亚行的主导力量。与其继续施压日本，要求其不参与亚投行，美国应该意识到，它的盟友加入亚投行将使它们对该行事务有更大发言权，稀释中国的投票权重。
Far from being a point of contention, the AIIB’s establishment could still turn out to be an example of how China can reinforce the principles that underpin multilateralism in the west. The US has played a poor hand in regard to the AIIB and its allies. The best course would be to acknowledge the mistake and be present at the creation.
不但没有成为一个争论焦点，亚投行的成立可能成为一个例证，说明中国能否夯实那些支撑西方多边主义的原则。美国在对待亚投行及自己的盟友方面迄今出牌糟糕。最好的对策是承认错误，并参与亚投行的创建。
