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Vertiginous levels of debt, industrial overcapacity, slowing growth and deflation: it has seldom been easier to spin a bearish yarn out of China’s economic data. In any fully developed economy this combination would augur an asset price bust or, at best, a spell of extreme volatility.
令人目眩的债务水平、工业产能过剩、增长放缓以及通缩：从中国经济数据中梳理出悲观故事，现在似乎比以往任何时候更容易。在任何成熟的发达经济体，这一组合将预示着资产价格崩溃，即便往好了说也得出现一段时间的极度波动。
Either may come to pass: for the first time in decades, capital is leaving the country, and the stock exchange is performing a passable impression of a market in the grip of late-stage mania.
这两种情况都有可能发生：几十年来第一次，资本正离开中国，而中国股市出现晚期狂热的典型症状。
But China is also a place where normal rules of thumb do not apply. Uniquely for an economy in its position — the largest as well as one of the fastest growing on the planet — its leadership has consciously planned for a transition towards a different growth model.
但中国也是一个不适用正常经验法则的地方。中国是世界上规模最大的经济体，也是增长最为迅速的经济体之一。对这样一个经济体来说，其领导层自觉地规划增长模式转型，这一点是独一无二的。
Weaning an economy this large from a lopsideddependence on investment was never going to be easy. China’s rulers have economic levers at hand, but knowing which ones to pull is hard.
让如此庞大的经济体摆脱对投资的极度依赖从来都不是一件容易的事情。中国领导人手头有经济杠杆，但难的是知道可以动用哪一个。
At every tremor in the growth rate, there is pressure on the authorities to goose up demand. In the past, China’s first recourse has been to unleash credit, such as by leaning on local authorities to splurge on infrastructure or property. But decades of this has strewn debt across the land, much through 10,000 local government financing vehicles (LGFVs), which have total liabilitiesexceeding 40 per cent of gross domestic product.
增长率的每一次波动，都会让中国政府受到提振需求的压力。在过去，中国首先想到的手段是释放信贷，比如要求地方政府大举投资于基础设施或房地产。但几十年这么做下来让中国债务激增，其中许多是通过1万家地方政府融资工具(LGFV)借入的，它们的债务总额与国内生产总值(GDP)之比超过40%。
The state recently eased up on demands that LGFVs repay their bank debt, and has just scrapped the loan-to-deposit cap imposed on banks. Such measures may free up lending conditions, but will prove more palliative than stimulating. Demand for credit is weak, and will not rebound any time soon: industry is suffering from overcapacity, and the LGFVs carry funding costs well above their return on assets. Non-performing loans are breaching new highs. Finance managers prefer to recover first before bingeing again.
中国政府最近放宽了让LGFV偿还银行债务的要求，并刚刚取消了对银行的存贷比要求。此类举措可能释放信贷空间，但事实将证明它们的作用在更大程度上是缓解疼痛、而不是刺激。信贷需求疲弱，而且不会迅速反弹：工业深受产能过剩之苦，LGFV的融资成本远高于资产回报率。不良贷款不断创出历史最高纪录。财务经理们在再次大举放贷前希望先收回贷款。
Moreover, the challenge is not so much to fire up growth as to spark it where it has not previously been strong. Those sectors that drove China’s dizzying ascent — property, infrastructure, manufacturing — cannot sustainably carry the economy forward. The People’s Bank of China, never a champion of laissez faire, has made clear that it wants banks to divert credit to agriculture and small business — not normally huge drivers of heavy investment.
此外，真正的挑战与其说是增长，不如说是在以往不够强劲的领域引燃增长。过去推动中国经济急速增长的行业——房地产、基础设施和制造业——不可能持续推动经济前行。从来不是自由放任的倡导者的中国人民银行(PBoC)明确表示，希望银行将信贷投向农业和小企业，而后者通常不会大举投资。
Against these China-specific challenges are some with a global flavour, notably incipient deflation. Falling prices have helped China hit its 7 per cent growth target despite historically weak demand in cash terms. It is nominal more than real aggregates that matter most to indebted companies, however; those in China now have revenues growing at just 0.7 per cent, no faster than in the trough of the 2008 financial crisis. This, again, is no auspicious backdrop for a rebound in investment.
在这些中国特有挑战的背景下，还有一些带有全球特色的挑战，尤其是刚刚出现的通缩态势。价格不断下降已帮助中国达到7%的增长目标，尽管按现金计算，需求处于历史低点。然而，对负债累累的公司来说，最重要的是名义总量而不是实际总量。中国企业的收入增长率仅为0.7%，不比2008年金融危机的低谷期间快多少。就投资反弹而言，这同样不是什么好兆头。
All these factors suggest that China’s gradual shift from investment dependence is not set to reverse. The measures the authorities have taken to counter a slowdown are precautionary, but presage no change in strategy. New drivers of growth — smaller businesses, consumer spending and services — may struggle to rebound as fast as the old drivers retrench, but with unemployment at a 15-year low, there is a willingness to tolerate the distress this causes to places most reliant on the old model.
以上这一切似乎表明，中国不会逆转逐步摆脱投资主导模式的转型努力。中国政府为抵御经济放缓而采取的措施是预防性的，但并不预示着战略的改变。新的增长动力——中小企业、消费支出和服务——可能难以弥补旧的增长动力缩减所造成的缺口。但随着失业率处于15年来的低点，中国政府将愿意容忍该战略给许多最依赖旧增长模式的地方带来的压力。
China’s flight on to a new growth path may prove turbulent, but there is as yet no reason to fear a hard landing. In fact, with more than 40 countries counting the Middle Kingdom as their top export partner, and Chinese imports decelerating, the bumpiest landing may await those beyond its borders.
中国向新增长模式的转型之路可能不会一帆风顺，但迄今还没有任何理由担心中国硬着陆。实际上，鉴于逾40个国家将中国视为最大的出口合作伙伴，而中国的进口在减速，面临最颠簸着陆的可能是那些中国以外的国家。
