评论
打印
But those two years had seen another momentous change.
但是，那两年也有一些巨大的进步。
The ten-fold increase in rotor positions had forced Poland to turn to the technically superior West.
盘位增加了10倍，迫使波兰向西方求助。
And now the twenty-six-fold increase had brought the United States into the electromagnetic relay race.
如今再次增加的26倍，把美国也带入了这场接力赛。
But the US Navy's cryptanalysts had been quick off the mark to see what was needed. Their department had been using modern machinery since 1935,
美国海军的密码分析员，非常敏锐地知道他们需要什么，他们的部门从1935年，就开始使用非常现代化的设备。
and when the black-out came in February 1942 they were not content to stand and wait until the British caught up: they could do it themselves.
当1942年2月破译中断时，他们不满足于站着等着英国追上来，他们自己可以做。
This did not accord at all with the British view, which held that the Americans should concentrate on the Japanese ciphers, and not duplicate the work done at Bletchley.
这与英国的观点完全不同，英国认为美国应该集中注意日本通信，不要重复布莱切利的工作。
But the US Navy was particularly insistent.
但是美国海军坚持这么做。
Already in June, its relations with GC and CS were 'strained' by complaints at the delay they experienced in obtaining a promised Bombe, and then
6月时，它和政密学校的关系变得紧张了，因为他们获许得到的炸弹机被拖延了，于是：
in September the Navy Department announced that it had developed a more advanced machine of its own, would have built 360 copies of it by the end of the year, and intended to attack the U-boat Enigma settings forthwith.
9月，海军部门宣布，它们己经自主研发了一套更先进的机器，年底之前将会制造360台，并立即用于潜艇谜机的破解。
These were figures to send Bletchley minds reeling.
这让布莱切利的人们感到震惊。
The whole of GC and CS Enigma work depended upon managing with just thirty Bombes in summer 1942, although another twenty were on the way.
整个政密学校直到1942年夏天，还只有30台炸弹机。
The Americans were proposing a take-over bid for the Atlantic work, by the brute-force expedient of building twenty-six times as many Bombes as the British had available, and using them in parallel.
而美国人能够制造这么多台机器，并且让它们同时工作，接手大西洋的情报。
