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After the Great Recession, in contrast, most central banks (the Bank of Japan being a notable exception) were content to prevent prices falling, and have not actively worked to make up lost output.
相比之下，大衰退后，大多数央行（日本银行是一个特殊的例外）都满足于防止物价下跌，而且没有主动地去恢复失去了的产出。
As a result, the recovery has been much weaker than in previous cycles, including the Depression, and monetary policy has taken longer to return to normal, leaving economies poorly prepared for the next recession.
其结果就是，复苏要比在以前的周期中，包括大萧条，弱了很多；同时，货币政策也用了更长的时间来恢复正常，从而就使得各个经济体对下一次危机准备不足。
Similarly, the Great Recession demonstrated the value of automatic fiscal stabilisers, but governments failed to seize the opportunity to link tax and benefits more closely to the business cycle.
同样，大衰退展示了自动财政稳定机制的价值。但是，各国政府却没能抓住机会，将税收和福利更加密切地与商业周期联系在一起。
Indeed, rules that have recently been adopted, such as Europe's fiscal compact, constrain rather than harness fiscal policy.
实际上，最近被采纳的一些规则，如欧洲的财政契约，与其说是驾驭财政政策，倒不如说是遏制财政政策。
The Depression enabled radical change by discrediting untrammelled capitalism and the elites who supported it.
通过让不受约束的资本主义和支持它的精英名誉扫地，大衰退是的激进改革成为可能。
That had dangerous side-effects: it also empowered fanatical and dangerous political outsiders.
这带来的危险的负面效应：它也让狂热和危险的政治局外人获得了权力。
Though financial and political elites were not spared a populist backlash after the Great Recession, they have largely kept their seat at the table, blocking the enactment of bolder reforms.
尽管政治和经济经营们在大衰退之后没有逃脱民粹主义的反攻倒算。但是他们大都抱住了自己的位置，阻碍了更大胆改革的施行。
The success of the response to the downturn helped avoid some of the disasters of the 1930s.
应对这场衰退的成功曾为避免上世纪30年代的那种灾难立下了汗马功劳。
But it also left the fundamentals of the system that produced the crisis unchanged.
但是，它也让造成了这场危机的这一体系的根本原封未动。
Ten years on, the hopes of radical reform are all but dashed.
十年过去了，激进改革的希望已经灰飞烟灭。
The sad upshot is that the global economy may have the opportunity to relearn the lessons of the past rather sooner than hoped.
这种不幸的结果在于，全球经济有可能比预想的还要快地有机会去重温过去的经验教训。
