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With Russian hackers in mind, NATO takes hard look at cyber strategy.
考虑到俄罗斯黑客，北约认真审视网络战略。
Nato strategists or rethinking its reliance on mutual defense among members when it comes to the cyber battlefield and fending off hackers.
北约战略家或重新思考其在网络战场和抵御黑客方面对成员国相互防御的依赖。
This particular article is by Anna Mulrine Grobe, who is a correspondent at the monitor, and it is dated February the 2nd.
这篇文章是安娜·穆林·格罗布写的，她是《基督教科学箴言报》的记者，写于2月2日。
Article 5 is the linchpin of the NATO pact, putting adversaries on notice that an attack against one is an attack against all.
第5条是北约条约的关键，让对手注意到，对一个国家的攻击就是对所有国家的攻击。
Founded on the Cold War logic of deterrence, the idea is that no aggressor will strike for fear of certain retaliation from combined NATO forces.
这一理念基于冷战时期的威慑逻辑，即没有侵略者会因为害怕北约联合部队的报复而发动攻击。
But with modern warfare expanding to virtual battlefields, NATO strategists are overhauling their cyber tactics.
但随着现代战争扩展到虚拟战场，北约战略家们正在彻底改革他们的网络战术。
That means rethinking the concept of deterrence, as well as what constitutes a cyberattack that triggers Article 5: a crucial issue amid tensions between Russia and NATO-supported (though nonmember) Ukraine.
这意味着重新思考威慑的概念，以及触发第五条的网络攻击的构成因素：在俄罗斯和北约支持的乌克兰（尽管是非成员国）之间关系紧张的情况下，这是一个关键问题。
Since 2019 it has been clear that a large-scale cyberattack on a member could trigger Article 5.
自2019年以来，很明显，针对成员国的大规模网络攻击可能触发第5条。
But last year, the alliance quietly announced that a series of lower-level cyberattacks could, cumulatively, be a tripwire for the article as well.
但去年，该联盟悄悄宣布，一系列较低级别的网络攻击累积起来也可能行成对条约的挑战。
The move marked a sea change in NATO cyber strategy, and sparked questions about how best to bolster NATO cyber defenses – and if offense, of a sort, might be part of the solution, too.
此举标志着北约网络战略发生了翻天覆地的变化，并引发了如何最好地加强北约网络防御的问题——如果进攻也可能是解决方案的一部分。
"It's a total change in how NATO views Article 5, and it actually could be perceived as escalatory and spiral out of control," says Stefan Soesanto, senior researcher in the Cyberdefense Project with the Risk and Resilience Team at the Center for Security Studies in Zurich.
苏黎世安全研究中心风险与恢复团队网络防御项目高级研究员斯特凡·索桑托表示：“这是北约对第5条看法的彻底改变，实际上可以认为这是逐步升级和失控。”
"No one is really sure whether and when Article 5 will apply."
“没有人真正确定第五条是否适用，以及何时适用。
NATO officials acknowledge that the opaqueness is part of the point.
北约官员承认，这种不透明是问题的一部分。
"Up until now, the idea was, if we don't completely disable a full country's infrastructure, it'll probably be OK.
“到目前为止，我们的想法是，如果我们不完全关闭整个国家的基础设施，那可能就没问题了。
With the new policy we're saying, well, that's not necessarily true," David van Weel, NATO's assistant secretary-general for emerging security challenges, said at a discussion with journalists in Brussels in December.
北约负责新安全挑战的助理秘书长大卫·范·韦尔去年12月在布鲁塞尔与记者讨论时表示，对于新政策，我们说的是，那不一定正确。
"I'm making it less defined. Sorry for that."
“我让它变得不那么清晰了。对此我深表歉意。
For the alliance, this ambiguity was a "sorry, not sorry" moment.
对于联盟来说，这种模棱两可是一个“抱歉”时刻。
That's because among NATO's security planners, there has been a growing belief that the military strategy of deterrence – so apt during the Cold War nuclear era – simply hasn't worked in cyberspace.
这是因为在北约的安全规划者中，越来越多的人认为，在冷战核时代非常合适的威慑军事战略在网络空间根本行不通。
"I would feel pretty confident in telling you that there is probably a scale of cyberattack that is deterred: absolute destruction.
“我非常有信心地告诉你，有一种规模的网络攻击是被阻止的：绝对破坏。
Clearly attacks like that don't happen every day.
很明显，这样的袭击并不是每天都会发生。
