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Investors in emerging markets need no reminder of the importance for EM assets of the US Federal Reserve — or do they?
新兴市场投资者不需要被提醒美联储(Fed)对新兴市场资产的重要性——不是吗？
In a working paper published on Tuesday, Robin Koepke, economist at the Institute of International Finance, an industry group, argues that investors, EM policymakers and the Fed itself have neglected the role of US interest rates in provoking currency, banking and debt crises in the emerging world.
在周二发布的一份研究报告中，行业组织国际金融协会(Institute of International Finance)经济学家罗宾•克普克(Robin Koepke)表示，投资者、新兴市场政策制定者以及美联储自身都忽视了美国利率在引发新兴国家汇率、银行及债务危机方面的作用。
It is a timely warning. His findings, he writes, “point to a heightened risk of emerging market crises in the coming years as the Fed continues to normalise interest rates”.
这是一次及时的预警。他写道，自己的研究结果“表明，随着美联储继续实施利率正常化，未来几年新兴市场爆发危机的风险将加剧。”
Many analysts may be surprised at the suggestion that they have underplayed the Fed. The two factors most often cited in relation to EM assets these days are the Fed and China, and the risk that they will deliver a negative shock.
许多分析师或许会对有关他们低估美联储的说法感到愕然。如今人们在谈论新兴市场资产时，最常提到的两个相关因素就是美联储和中国，以及它们将来造成负面冲击的风险。
Mr Koepke argues, however, that the role of US interest rates in provoking EM crises has not been fully understood. He presents evidence that the probability of EM crises is substantially higher during a conjunction of three conditions: during a Fed tightening cycle, when the federal funds rate is above its natural rate (the rate that leads actual output to converge to potential output), and when market participants are surprised by signals that the Fed will tighten policy faster than previously expected.
然而，克普克认为，美国利率在引发新兴市场危机方面的作用未被充分认识。他提供的证据表明，如果以下三种情况同时出现的话——处于美联储紧缩周期，联邦基金利率高于自然利率（导致实际产出趋近潜在产出的利率），以及美联储将比先前预期更快收紧政策的信号让市场参与者感到惊讶——新兴市场爆发危机的几率会大大增加。
Under these conditions, he argues, the Fed cannot only trigger crises itself; it can also increase the vulnerability of EMs to crises provoked by other factors.
克普克表示，在这些情况下，美联储不但能引发危机，还会增加新兴市场因其他因素引发危机的脆弱性。
None of these conditions is in place now. Fed tightening, begun in December, has been put on hold. The federal funds rate (the interbank overnight lending rate) is estimated to be more than a percentage point below its natural level. And there have been no surprises from the Fed. Last December’s 25 basis point rise in the Fed’s policy rate, for example, was comprehensively signalled in advance.
这些情况眼下一个都不存在。去年12月开始的美联储政策紧缩已经暂停。联邦基金利率（银行间隔夜拆借利率）估计低于自然利率逾一个百分点。美联储一直未作出意外之举。例如，美联储去年12月将政策利率提升25个基点之前发出了大量信号。
Mr Koepke’s point is that these conditions may change and that their significance is underestimated.
克普克认为，这些情况或将发生变化，而它们的意义被低估了。
Typically, he writes, analysts “see the root cause of emerging markets’ susceptibility to crises in weak institutions that make countries vulnerable to economic and financial instability.”
克普克写道，分析师们常常“认为新兴市场危机易发性的根源在于制度薄弱，这使得这些国家易受经济、金融不稳定的影响。”
He argues, however, that “US monetary policy is often just as important as domestic factors in explaining the incidence of EM crises, if not more important.”
然而，他认为，“在解释新兴市场危机的发生率时，美国的货币政策往往与新兴市场国内因素同样重要——如果不是更重要的话。”
The first chart shows the total incidence of banking, currency and debt default crises in emerging markets since the 1970s, set against the nominal federal funds rate. Mr Koepke gives this as evidence that high and rising rates typically precede periods of EM crisis.
图表一显示的是上世纪70年代以来新兴市场银行、汇率及债务违约危机的发生次数——对照名义联邦基金利率。克普克以此为据，试图证明高位且不断上升的利率通常在新兴市场危机爆发周期之前出现。
The second chart shows the real federal funds rate (ie discounting for inflation) and the real natural rate. Again, when the federal funds rate is above its natural rate, EM crises are more common.
图表二显示的是实际联邦基金利率（计入通胀因素后）和实际自然利率。可以再次看到，当联邦基金利率高于自然利率时，新兴市场危机更为常见。
High and rising US rates may quickly become drivers of EM crises: such conditions may lead to higher borrowing costs in EMs, along with capital outflows and an unwillingness by the financial sector to take risks.
高位且不断上升的美国利率可能很快成为新兴市场危机的驱动因素：此类条件可能导致新兴市场借贷成本升高，还有资本外流以及金融部门冒险意愿下降。
The potential impact of any surprise move in Fed policy was clear in the “taper tantrum” of 2013, when just the suggestion that the Fed might soon rein in its ultra-loose monetary policies was enough to provoke a wave of global panic.
美联储政策中任何意外举动的潜在影响，在2013年的“缩减恐慌”(taper tantrum)中表露无遗，当时，仅是美联储可能很快缩减其超宽松货币政策力度的暗示就足以引发一波全球恐慌。
All three factors, says Mr Koepke, were at work in the Mexican currency crisis of 1994-95, when the Fed embarked on a tightening cycle in jumps of 25, 50 and crucially, in November 1994, of 75 basis points.
克普克表示，就1994-95年墨西哥汇率危机而言，三个因素都起了作用，当时美联储开始以25、50甚至75个基点（1994年11月）的加息幅度进入紧缩周期。
“The Fed was much more aggressive than expected,” Mr Koepke says. “Taking markets by surprise was clearly not the way to go.” (This was before the Fed began making regular public statements after its monetary policy meetings.)
“美联储比外界所预期的更加咄咄逼人，”克普克表示，“让市场感到意外显然并非上策。”（那时美联储尚未建立在货币政策会议后发布公开声明的制度。）
By the time of the Asian crisis of 1997-98, he says, the Fed had become more responsive and pulled back from its tightening cycle on concern that the turmoil in Southeast Asia would affect the US economy.
他说，到1997-98年亚洲金融危机爆发时，美联储的回应已变得更加迅速，它退出了紧缩周期，担心东南亚的动荡会影响美国经济。
What dangers does the Fed present to EMs today? One of the biggest risks, says Mr Koepke, is that it might “get behind the curve” and delay raising rates for too long. This would result not only in a surprisingly big hike when it came, but also a higher terminal interest rate than would otherwise be the case.
美联储给当下的新兴市场带来了何种风险？克普克表示，最大的风险之一是，它可能“落在曲线后面”，延误加息太久。相比正确路径，这将导致最终的加息幅度大得出乎意料，最终的利率绝对水平也更高。
“People are used to the Fed saying it will tighten but, in the end, with volatility or other risks on the horizon, policymakers take it back and it’s a case of if in doubt, stay on hold,” Mr Koepke says.
“人们已习惯于这样的套路：美联储称要进行紧缩，结果当市场波动或其他风险浮出水面时，政策制定者便收回紧缩言论，呈现出‘如有疑问，按兵不动’的规律，”克普克说。
But with the US close to full employment and inflation moving up towards the target, “you can see how tighter policy would be warranted,” he says. “It wouldn’t take a whole lot to shift the equation.”
但随着美国接近实现充分就业，随着通胀向目标水平趋近，“你可以看到收紧政策是有道理的，”他说，“不需要很多就足以改变整个平衡”。
In the apparent belief that “lower for longer” now means “lower forever”, investors have been piling into EM assets in recent weeks.
显然相信“更长时间保持较低位”如今意味着“永远保持较低位”的投资者，最近几周已经涌向新兴市场资产。
Mr Koepke warns that this could easily be upset by the Fed.
克普克警告，这一势头很容易被美联储扰乱。
“Even though there is significant awareness [of the role of Fed policy], market dynamics can become unstable or unfavourable relatively easily,” he says. “Then you get into a self-reinforcing cycle of selling pressure.”
“即便人们充分了解了（美联储政策的作用），市场动态也可能相对容易地变得不稳定或不利，”他说，“届时你将陷入一个卖盘压力自我强化的循环。”
