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So you know when you're doubled over in pain and you're wondering, is it your appendix or maybe you ate something funny?
你们有没有过身体特别的难受的时候，你在想是不是得了阑尾炎，或者是吃坏了肚子？
Well, when that happens to me, I call my friend Sasha -- Sasha is a doctor
我碰上这种事，我会给我的朋友萨莎打电话，萨莎是个医生，
and I say, "Should I rush to the nearest emergency room in a panic? Or am I OK to relax and just wait it out?"
我说“我是不是得火急火燎得跑去最近的急救中心？”还是我可以放轻松，等它自己好就行？”
Yes, I am that annoying friend.
没错，我就是那个烦人的朋友。
But in September 2017, friends of mine were suddenly calling me for my professional opinion.
不过在2017年的9月份，我的一些朋友突然打电话找我，来征求我专业的看法。
And no, I'm not a doctor, but they were asking me questions of life and death.
而且不，我并不是个医生，不过他们问我的是关于生与死的问题。
So what was going on in September of 2017?
那么2017年九9月发生了什么呢？
Well, North Korea was suddenly and scarily all over the news.
朝鲜在一夜之间，遍布各大新闻媒体，引得人心惶惶。
Kim Jong-un had tested missiles potentially capable of hitting major US cities,
金正恩进行了导弹的试射试验，而这些导弹具有打击美国主要城市的潜力，
and President Trump had responded with tweets of "fire and fury."
总统特朗普在推特中以“炮火与怒火”回击。
And there was real concern that tensions would escalate to a potential war or even nuclear weapons use.
人们非常担忧目前紧张的局势有可能恶化，升级成一场潜在的战争，或甚至要使用核武器。
So what my friends were calling and asking was: Should they panic or were the OK to relax?
所以我的朋友打电话来问的是：他们是否要开始恐慌，还是说他们可以放心？
But really, they were asking me a fundamental question: "Am I safe?"
其实他们都在问一个基本问题：“我现在安全吗？”
While I was reassuring them that, no, they didn't need to worry just yet, the irony of their question dawned on me.
在我劝他们放轻松，没事的，他们还不必为此担心的时候，我意识到他们问题中很讽刺的一点。
What they hadn't really thought about is that we've all been living under a much larger cloud for decades
他们没有想到的是，我们在这种乌云笼罩的状况下生活数十年了，
potentially a mushroom cloud -- without giving it much thought.
甚至还可能是蘑菇云，我们却没去多想。
Now it's not surprising that friends of mine and many others like them
那么如今我的朋友和许多其他人
don't know much about nuclear weapons and don't think about them.
不怎么了解也不去关注核武器，也就不奇怪了。
After all, the end of the Cold War, the United States and Russia, tension abated,
毕竟冷战结束后，美国和俄罗斯间局势缓和，
we started dismantling nuclear weapons, and they started to become a relic of the past.
我们开始销毁核武器，然后这种武器逐渐成为历史。
Generations didn't have to grow up with the specter of nuclear war hanging over their heads.
新一代人不需要在核战争的在阴霾下长大。
And there other reasons people don't like to think about nuclear weapons.
还有其他的原因让人不喜欢去想核武器的事。
It's scary, overwhelming. I get it. Sometimes I wish I could have chosen a cheerier field to study.
它很吓人，让人无所适从。我能理解。有时我也希望我当初选个愉快一点的研究领域。
Perhaps tax law would have been more uplifting.
也许学税法更能振奋人心一些。
But in addition to that, people have so many other things to think about in their busy lives,
但是除此之外，人们在繁忙的生活中有那么多别的东西要去考虑，
and they'd much prefer to think about something over which they feel they have some semblance of control,
他们更愿意去为那些看似在他们控制之下的事情思考，
and they assume that other people, smarter than they on this topic, are working away to keep us all safe.
并且他们都以为总有别人，比他们自己在这方面更聪明的人，正在全力解决这个问题，好让大家都平平安安。
And then, there are other reasons people don't talk about this, and one is because we, as nuclear experts,
另外人们不爱讨论核武器还有其他原因，其中之一便是我们核专家，
use a whole lot of convoluted jargon and terminology to talk about these issues: CVID, ICBM, JCPOA.
会用很多晦涩难懂的行话和专业术语来谈论这些问题：CVID、ICBM、JCPOA。
It's really inaccessible for a lot of people.
这对很多人来说是难以理解的。
And, in reality, it actually sometimes I think makes us numb to what we're really talking about here.
并且事实上，我认为有时这反而让我们对我们真正想要讨论的东西感到麻木。
And what we are really talking about here is the fact that,
而我们在此真正想要讨论的东西，实际上是，
while we've made dramatic reductions in the number of nuclear weapons since the Cold War,
尽管我们从冷战以来已经在数量上大幅减少核武器，
right now, there are almost 15,000 in the world today. 15,000.
但是现在世界上仍然有将近一万五千枚核弹头。一万五千枚。
The United States and Russia have over 90 percent of these nuclear weapons.
美国和俄罗斯拥有超过90%的核武器。
If you're wondering, these are the countries that have the rest.
如果你想知道的话，这些国家拥有剩下的核武器。
But they have far fewer, ranging in the sort of 300-ish range and below.
但是他们拥有的数量少太多了，在大约300多的范围内或者更少。
Adding to this situation is the fact that we have new technologies that potentially bring us new challenges.
更加雪上加霜的是，我们拥有的最新科技可能会给我们带来全新的挑战。
Could you imagine, one day, countries like ours and others
你可以想象吗，某一天类似我们的和他们的国家，
potentially ceding decisions about a nuclear strike to a robot, based on algorithms?
有可能把执行核打击的决策大权交给一个基于计算机算法的机器人来决定。
And what data do they use to inform those algorithms? This is pretty terrifying.
那么他们要用什么数据来支持这些算法呢？这太可怕了。
So adding to this are terrorism potential, cyberattacks, miscalculation, misunderstanding.
除此之外还有潜在的恐怖主义、网络攻击、计算差错和各国间的误会。
The list of nuclear nightmares tends to grow longer by the day.
核武器带来的噩梦只会一天比一天多。
And there are a number of former officials, as well as experts,
并且有不少前任政府官员和专家们
who worry that right now, we're in greater danger than we were in various points in the Cold War.
担心我们现在正处于比冷战的各个时刻更大的危险之中。
So this is scary. What can we do?
这是很恐怖。那我们能做些什么？
Well, thankfully, we don't have to rely on the advice from the 1950s.
谢天谢地的是，我们不需要依靠20世纪50年代的建议。
We can take some control, and the way we do that is by starting to ask some fundamental questions
我们可以对此有所控制，而为了实现这个，我们要对于现状问几个基本的问题，
about the status quo and whether we are happy with the way it is.
以及我们是否觉得现状可以接受。
We need to begin asking questions of ourselves and of our elected officials, and I'd like to share three with you today.
我们要向我们自己提问，向政府官员们提问，而今天我很乐意和你们分享三个问题。
The first one is, "How much nuclear risk are you willing to take or tolerate?"
第一个是，“你愿意承担多大的核风险？”
Right now, nuclear policy depends on deterrence theory.
现在，核武器政策取决于威慑理论。
Developed in the 1950s, the idea is that one country's nuclear weapons prevents another country from using theirs.
这套理论在50年代提出，意思是一个国家拥有核武器会防止其他国家用他们的核武器。
So you nuke me, I nuke you, and we both lose. So in a way, there's a stalemate.
你核爆我，我就核爆你，我们都是输家。所以某种程度上说，双方陷入僵局。
No one uses their weapons, and we're all safe. But this theory has real questions.
没人用他们的武器，我们就都安全了。但这个理论有些实际的问题。
There are experts who challenge this theory and wonder: Does it really work this way in practice?
一些挑战这个理论的专家提出：现实中真的会这样吗？
It certainly doesn't allow for mistakes or miscalculations.
这套理论不能容忍一点失误和计算错误。
Now, I don't know about you,
我不知道你们怎么想，
but I feel pretty uncomfortable gambling my future survival, yours, and our future generations',
不过这让我非常不安，要把你我的下一代的存亡作为赌注，
on a theory that is questionable and doesn't allow any room for a mistake.
全押在一个存在争议并且毫无容错率的理论上。
It makes me even more uncomfortable to be threatening the evaporation of millions of people on the other side of the Earth.
让我更加不安的是，要去威胁用核武器让地球另一边数以百万计的人全部蒸发。
Surely we can do better for ourselves, drawing on our ingenuity to solve complex problems, as we have in the past.
我们当然自己可以做得更好，运用我们的创造力去解决复杂的问题，就像我们过去一样。
After all, this is a man-made, human-made
终究，这都是人造的，人类制造的，
I shouldn't say "man," because women were involved -- a human-made problem.
我不该说man，因为女人也参与其中--一个人类制造的问题。
We have human solutions that should be possible.
我们有应该可行的、更有人性的解决方案。
So, next question: "Who do you think should make nuclear decisions?"
所以下一个问题：“你认为谁应该决定使用核武器？”
Right now, in this democracy, in the United States, one person gets to decide whether or not to launch a nuclear strike.
现在在我们这个民主政体，在美国，有一个人可以决定是否发动核打击。
They don't have to consult anybody. So that's the president.
这个人不需要咨询任何人。这就是我们的总统。
He or she can decide -- within a very limited amount of time, under great pressure, potentially,
他或她可以在非常有限的时间内，根据不同情况，也许在巨大的压力之下，
depending on the scenario, maybe based on a miscalculation or a misunderstanding
也许基于错误的计算或误解的基础上，
they can decide the fate of millions of lives: yours, mine, our community's.
他们可以决定数以百万计的人的命运：你的、我的以及整个社会的。
And they can do this and launch a nuclear strike, potentially setting in motion the annihilation of the human race. Wow.
总统可以这样做，发动一次核打击，很可能推动毁灭全人类的进程。哇哦。
This doesn't have to be our reality, though,
不过我们并不用接受这样的现实，
and in fact, in a number of other countries that have nuclear weapons,
实际上很多别的，拥有核武器的国家并不是这样的，
it's not, including countries that are not democracies.
包括不是民主政体的国家。
We created this system. We can change it. And there's actually a movement underway to do so.
我们创造这套体制，我们也可以改变它，而且有正在进行的运动在为此努力。
So this leads me to my third question: "What do your elected officials know about nuclear weapons,
那这就引出我的第三个问题：“你们的政府官员对核武器有多少了解，
and what types of decisions are they likely to take on your behalf?"
并且他们会代表你做出什么样的决定？”
Well, Congress has a very important role to play in oversight of and interrogating US nuclear weapons policy.
确实国会在其中扮演非常重要的角色，去监督和讯问美国的核武政策。
They can decide what to fund, what not to fund, and they represent you.
他们可以决定给什么拨款，不给什么拨款，而且他们代表你们。
Now unfortunately, since the end of the Cold War,
现在很不幸的是，自冷战结束以来，
we've seen a real decline in the level of understanding, on Capitol Hill, about these issues.
我们看到的是华盛顿在这些问题上理解的程度有真真切切的下降。
While we are starting to see some terrific new champions emerge,
在我们开始见证新的优秀的政治家崭露头角的同时，
the reality is that the general lack of awareness is highly concerning,
现实却是这种普遍缺乏的意识，让人非常担忧，
given that these people need to make critically important decisions.
尤其是这些人要负责做出极其重要的决定。
To make matters worse, the political partisanship that currently grips Washington also affects this issue.
更糟糕的是，在政府内根深蒂固的党派偏见与纷争也同样对此有影响。
This wasn't always the case, though.
不过这并不是总是这样的。
At the end of the Cold War, members from both sides of the aisle
在冷战结束时，对抗的双方
had a really good understanding about the nuclear challenges we were facing and worked together on cooperative programs.
都具有对于我们所面对的核问题的深刻理解，并且共同进行合作项目。
They recognized that nuclear risk reduction was far too important to allow it to succumb to political partisanship.
他们认识到核武器的削减实在太重要了，以至于政治斗争都要为它让路。
They created programs such as the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program,
他们开启了一些项目，比如《纳恩-卢格减少威胁合作计划》，
which sought to lock down and eliminate vulnerable nuclear material in the former Soviet Union.
该计划旨在控制与销毁前苏联不稳定的核原料。
So we need to return to this era of bipartisanship,
所以我们需要回到那个当年双边合作的年代，
mutual problem-solving that's based on understanding and awareness about the challenges we face and the real nuclear dangers.
根据对于我们面对的挑战和实际核危机的意识和理解，以此来相互解决问题。
And that's where you come in. Public pressure is important. Leaders need a constituent base to act.
而这就是你出场的时候。公众的压力很关键。领导人需要一群忠实的选民才会行动起来。
So create that constituent base, by asking them some simple questions.
那么为了创造这群忠实的选民，问他们一些简单的问题。
Ask them, "What do you know about nuclear weapons?" "Do you have a nuclear expert on your staff?
问他们，“你对核武器了解多少？”“你的麾下是否有核专家？
Or, if not, do you know somebody you could refer to if you need to make an important decision?"
或者如果没有，你知道有谁在你要做出重大决定的时候，可以向其咨询和请教的？”
Start to find out what they believe and whether it aligns with your own views and values.
开始了解他们的想法，看看是否和你自己的看法和价值观所吻合。
Ask them, "How would you choose to spend US national treasure?
问他们，“你会怎么去用美国的国家财富？
On a new nuclear arms race or another national security priority, such as cybersecurity or climate change?"
是用在新的核武军备竞赛上，或是别的国家安全优先事项，比如网络安全或者气候变化？”
Ask them, "Are you willing to put aside partisanship
问他们，“你是否愿意先将党派争斗放在一边，
to address this existential threat that affects my survival and your constituents' survival?"
好好着手解决现存的、影响我和你忠实选民生命的威胁？”
Now, people will tell you nuclear policy is far too difficult to understand
然后人们会告你，核武器政策太难理解了，
and complexed and nuanced for the general public to understand, let alone debate.
对于普通大众来讲，实在太复杂有太多细节了，更不要说讨论了。
After all, this is "national security."
毕竟，这是“国家安全”。
There needs to be secrets. Don't let that put you off.
有些事必须得是机密。但不要被这套说辞迷惑了。
We debate all sorts of issues that are critically important to our lives -- why should nuclear weapons be any different?
我们讨论各种各样对于我们生活至关重要的事情，为什么核武器就是特例？
We debate health care, education, the environment.
我们讨论医保、教育和环境。
Surely congressional oversight, civic participation that are such hallmarks of US democracy, surely they apply here.
当然作为美国民主标志的国会监督和公民参与，这些自然都在此适用。
After all, these are cases of life and death that we're talking about.
毕竟我们谈论的事关乎生死。
And we won't all agree, but whether or not you believe nuclear weapons keep us safe or that nuclear weapons are a liability,
我们虽不会全都同意彼此，但无论你觉得核武器确保我们的安全，或者核武器只是个累赘，
I urge you to put aside partisan, ideological issues and listen to each other.
我想在此劝大家放下党派偏见与意识形态，好好聆听他人。
So I'll tell you now what I didn't have the guts to tell my friends at the time.
那么我现在可以告诉你们，当初我没有胆量告诉我朋友的话。
No, you're not safe -- not just because of North Korea.
不，你并不安全--不仅仅是因为朝鲜。
But there is something you can do about it.
不过你可以尽自己的一份力。
Demand that your elected representatives can give you answers to your questions,
要求你们选出的议员，给出你们问题的答案，
and answers that you can live with and that billions of others can live with too.
你们可以接受的以及千千万万民众们可以接受的答案。
And if they can't, stay on them until they can.
如果他们做不到，反复跟提这事直到他们做到为止。
And if that doesn't work, find others, who are able to represent your views.
如果还是没用，找其他可以代表你们观点的人。
Because by doing so, we can begin to change the answer to the question "Am I safe?"
因为只有这样做，我们才能改变这个问题的答案：“我安全吗？”
