我所要考虑的这一群成功投资者，共有一位共同的智力族长——本杰明·格雷厄姆。但是，这些离开此智力家族的孩童，都是依据非常不同的方法猜测他们自己的“铜板”。他们各自前往不同的地方，买卖不同的股票和企业，但他们的综合绩效绝对无法用随机因素加以解释。他们做相同的猜测，并不是因为领导者下达某一项指令，因此也无法用这种方式解释他们的表现。族知只提供了猜测铜板的智力理论，每位学生都必须自行决定如何运用这项理论。

　　The common intellectual theme of the investors from Graham-and-Doddsville is this： they search for discrepancies between the value of a business and the price of small pieces of that business in the market. Essentially， they exploit those discrepancies without the efficient market theorist's concern as to whether the stocks are bought on Monday or Thursday， or whether it is January or July， etc. Incidentally， when businessmen buy businesses， which is just what our Graham & Dodd investors are doing through the purchase of marketable stocks —— I doubt that many are cranking into their purchase decision the day of the week or the month in which the transaction is going to occur. If it doesn't make any difference whether all of a business is being bought on a Monday or a Friday， I am baffled why academicians invest extensive time and effort to see whether it makes a difference when buying small pieces of those same businesses. Our Graham & Dodd investors， needless to say， do not discuss beta， the capital asset pricing model， or covariance in returns among securities. These are not subjects of any interest to them. In fact， most of them would have difficulty defining those terms. The investors simply focus on two variables： price and value.

　　来自“格雷厄姆一多德都市”的投资者所具备的共同智力结构是：他们探索企业的价值与该企业市场价格之间的差异。事实上，他们利用其间的差异，却不在意效率市场理论家所关心的问题：股票究竟在星期一或星期—：买进，或是在一月份或七月份买进……。当企业家买进某家公司时——这正是格雷厄姆一多德都市的投资者透过上市股票所从事的行为——我怀疑有多少人会在意交易必须发生于某个月份或某个星期的第一天。如果企业的买进交易发生在星期一或星期五没有任何差别，则我无法了解学术界人士为何要花费大量的时间和精力，探讨代表该企业部分股权的交易发生时的差异。毋庸多说，格雷厄姆一多德都市的投资者并不探讨bate、资本资产定价模型、证券投资报酬本的变异数。这些都不足他们所关心的议题。事实上，他们大多数难以界定上述学术名词。他们只在乎两项实数：价格与价值。

　　I always find it extraordinary that so many studies are made of price and volume behavior， the stuff of chartists. Can you imagine buying an entire business simply because the price of the business had been marked up substantially last week and the week before？ Of course， the reason a lot of studies are made of these price and volume variables is that now， in the age of computers， there are almost endless data available about them. It isn't necessarily because such studies have any utility； it's simply that the data are there and academicians have [worked] hard to learn the mathematical skills needed to manipulate them. Once these skills are acquired， it seems sinful not to use them， even if the usage has no utility or negative utility. As a friend said， to a man with a hammer， everything looks like a nail.

　　面对图形分析师所研究的价量行为，我始终感觉惊讶。你是否会仅仅因为某家公司的市场价格在本周或前一周剧扬。便决定购买该企业呢？在日前电脑化的时代，人们之所以会大量研究价格与成交量的行为，理由是这两项变数拥有了无数的资料。研究未必是因为其具任何功用；而只是因为资料既然存在，学术界人士便必须努力学习操作这些资料所需要的数学技巧。—旦拥有这些技巧，不去运用它们便会带来罪恶感，即使这些技巧的运用没有任何功用，或只会带来负面功用。也在所不惜。如同一位朋友所说的，对一位持铁锤的人来说，每—样事看起来都像是钉子。

　　I think the group that we have identified by a common intellectual home is worthy of study. Incidentally， despite all the academic studies of the influence of such variables as price， volume， seasonality， capitalization size， etc.， upon stock performance， no interest has been evidenced in studying the methods of this unusual concentration of value-oriented winners.

　　我认为，这一群具有共同智力起源的投资者非常值得我们研究。虽然学术界不断地对价格、成交量、季节性、资本规模以及其他变数，研究它们对股票绩效的影响，但这群以价值为导向赢家的方法却毫不受人关心。

　　I begin this study of results by going back to a group of four of us who worked at Graham-Newman Corporation from 1954 through 1956. There were only four —— I have not selected these names from among thousands. I offered to go to work at Graham-Newman for nothing after I took Ben Graham's class， but he turned me down as overvalued. He took this value stuff very seriously！ After much pestering he finally hired me. There were three partners and four of us as the “peasant” level. All four left between 1955 and 1957 when the firm was wound up， and it's possible to trace the record of three.

　　关于这一项绩效的研究，我首先要追溯到从1954年到 1956年间，工作于Greham—Newman公司的四位伙伴。我们总共四个人——我并不是从数以千计的对象中挑选这四个人。在我选修本杰明·格雷厄姆的课程之后，我要求进人Graham—Newman公司担任无给职的工作，但格雷厄姆却以价值高估而拒绝了我的要求。他对价值看得非常严重！经我不断地恳求，他最后答应雇我。当时公司有三位合伙股东，以及我们四位“学徒”。公司结束经营之后，我们四个人陆续在1955年到1957年间离开公司，目前只能够追踪其中三个人的投资记录。

　　The first example （see Table 1*正文不附表格，可参考查询文末所附的英文PDF文件） is that of Walter Schloss. Walter never went to college， but took a course from Ben Graham at night at the New York Institute of Finance. Walter left Graham-Newman in 1955 and achieved the record shown here over 28 years. Here is what “Adam Smith” —— after I told him about Walter —— wrote about him in Supermoney （1972）：

　　第一个案例（*正文不附表格，可参考查询文末所附的英文PDF文件）是华特·史洛斯。华特从来没有念过大学，但他在纽约金融协会参加了本杰明·葛雷厄姆的夜间课程。华特在1955年离开Greham—Newman公司。以下是“亚当·史密斯”——在我和他谈论有关华特的事迹之后——在《超级金钱》（Supermoney，1972年） 一书中对他所做的描述：

　　He has no connections or access to useful information. Practically no one in Wall Street knows him and he is not fed any ideas. He looks up the numbers in the manuals and sends for the annual reports， and that's about it.

　　他从来不运用或接触有用的资讯。在华尔街几乎没有人认识他，所以没有人提供他有关投资的观念。他只参考手册上的数字，并要求企业寄年报给他，情况便是如此。

　　In introducing me to （Schloss） Warren had also， to my mind， described himself. “He never forgets that he is handling other people's money， and this reinforces his normal strong aversion to loss.” He has total integrity and a realistic picture of himself. Money is real to him and stocks are real —— and from this flows an attraction to the “margin of safety” principle.

　　当华特介绍我们认识时，他曾经描述“他从来没有忘记自己是在管理别人的资金，这进一步强化了他对于风险的厌恶。”他有高尚的品格。并以务实的态度自持。对他来说。金钱是真实的，股票也真实的——并从此而接受了“安全边际”的原则。