华特的投资组合极为分散，目前拥有的股票远越过 100支。他了解如何选股，将价格远低于其价值者出售给私人投资者。这便是他所做的一切。他不担心目前是不是一月份，不在乎今天是不是星期一，也不关心今年是不是大选年。他的想法非常单纯，如果某家公司值一美元，若我能够以40美分买进，我迟早会获利。他便是如此不断地行动：他所持有的股票种类远比我的多 ——而且比我更不关心企业的本质；我对华特似乎没有太大的影响力。这是他的长处之—，没有人能够对他产生足够的影响力。

　　The second case is Tom Knapp， who also worked at Graham-Newman with me. Tom was a chemistry major at Princeton before the war； when he came back from the war， he was a beach bum. And then one day he read that Dave Dodd was giving a night course in investments at Columbia. Tom took it on a noncredit basis， and he got so interested in the subject from taking that course that he came up and enrolled at Columbia Business School， where he got the MBA degree. He took Dodd's course again， and took Ben Graham's course. Incidentally， 35 years later I called Tom to ascertain some of the facts involved here and I found him on the beach again. The only difference is that now he owns the beach！

　　第二个案例是汤姆· 科纳普，他曾经和我一起在Greham—Newman公司工作。汤姆于大战之前曾在普林斯顿大学主修化学，大战结束之后，他经常在海滩游荡。某一天，他得知大卫·多德将在可伦比亚大学开夜间投资课程。汤姆以旁听方式选修该课程，之后他对投资学科产生了浓厚的兴趣，于是正式注册进入哥伦比亚大学商学院，并且获得了MBA学位。35年之后，我拨电话给汤姆，确定某些有关此一主题的事，我发现他仍然在海滩游荡。惟—的差别是。他目前拥有一片海滩！

　　In 1968， Tom Knapp and Ed Anderson， also a Graham disciple， along with one or two other fellows of similar persuasion， formed Tweedy， Browne Partners， and their investment results appear in Table 2. Tweedy， Browne built that record with very wide diversification. They occasionally bought control of businesses， but the record of the passive investments is equal to the record of the control investments.

　　在1968年，汤姆与艾德·安德生——也是葛拉汉的信徒——以及其他一、两位有共同信念的人，组成了帝地布朗合伙公司。帝地布朗合伙公司的投资高度分散。他们偶尔会从事控制股权的投资，但其被动式的投资绩效约略等于控权式投资的表现。

　　Table 3 describes the third member of the group who formed Buffett Partnership in 1957. The best thing he did was to quit in 1969. Since then， in a sense， Berkshire Hathaway has been a continuation of the partnership in some respects. There is no single index I can give you that I would feel would be a fair test of investment management at Berkshire. But I think that any way you figure it， it has been satisfactory.

　　表3是格雷厄姆－纽曼公司第三位员工的投资业绩记录。他在1957年成立巴菲特合伙公司。他做出的最明智的决策是在1969年结束合伙公司。从此之后，伯克夏。哈撒韦公司在某种程度上成为合伙公司的延续。我无法给各位单一的指数，用以合理地测试伯克夏公司的投资管理。但是，我认为各位不论如何考验它，它的表现一直都令人满意。

　　Table 4 shows the record of the Sequoia Fund， which is managed by a man whom I met in 1951 in Ben Graham's class， Bill Ruane. After getting out of Harvard Business School， he went to Wall Street. Then he realized that he needed to get a real business education so he came up to take Ben's course at Columbia， where we met in early 1951. Bill's record from 1951 to 1970， working with relatively small sums， was far better than average. When I wound up Buffett Partnership I asked Bill if he would set up a fund to handle all our partners， so he set up the Sequoia Fund. He set it up at a terrible time， just when I was quitting. He went right into the two-tier market and all the difficulties that made for comparative performance for value-oriented investors. I am happy to say that my partners， to an amazing degree， not only stayed with him but added money， with the happy result shown here.

　　表四是红杉基金经理人比尔·卢昂的投资业绩记录，我在 1951年格雷厄姆的讲座中认识他。哈佛商学院毕业之后，他进入华尔街。稍后，他发觉需要接受真正的商业教育，于是参加了格雷厄姆在哥伦比亚大学开办的讲座，我们便相逢于1951年初。从1951年到1970年间。比尔所管理的资金规模相当小，绩效却远比大盘来得好。当我结束巴菲特合伙公司的业务时，我要求比尔成立—个基金公司，来管理我们合伙股东的资金，他于是成立了红杉基金。他成立基金的时机非常不利。他面临两个层次的市场，以及以价值为导向的投资者相当难以运作的情况。我十分乐于提及一点。我的合伙股东不仅继续委托他管理，还投入更多的资金，而且对他的表现十分赞赏。